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THE SURVIVING RELIGIOUS TEST
THE SURVIVING RELIGIOUS TEST
BY FRANK SWANCARA
Mr. Mechem in his classic work on Public Officers wrote that
"it is well settled that religious beliefs or opinions can not be a
test of political rights and privileges."1 This statement is true
only in a restricted sense. While no public officer need believe in
any doctrine which is peculiar to some particular sect, yet in many
states one is not eligible to public office unless he possesses the
religious belief which at common law was required of witnesses.
Generally this situation results from the constitutional require-
ment of an oath of office.
To understand the current American law on this subject it is
necessary to know what religious beliefs were required by the
common law for the taking of a valid oath. In the early stages of
the development of the common law only those who believed in
all the tenets of the Catholic Church were allowed to take an
oath.2 This intolerant view was natural in days before the
Reformation when the Church and state were very closely inter-
twined. This harshness was only slightly relaxed in the time
of Lord Coke. In Calvin's Case3 the Lord Chief Justice announced
that "only a Christian" could take an oath. To support his posi-
tion, Lord Coke invoked the Bible as the foundation of the Com-
mon Law, citing the text, "And what concord hath Christ with
Belial? or what portion hath a believer with an unbeliever? ' ' 4
When the famous case of Omichund v. Barker5 arose in 1744,
Lord Chancellor Hardwicke announced during the course of the
argument by counsel that Lord Coke's rule was impolitic and that
its enforcement would "destroy all that trade and commerce from
which this nation reaps such great benefits". This materialistic
argument was strengthened by the observation that it was very
IMechem, Public Officers (1890) 40.
2 Bracton, fol. 16; Briton, Challenge de Jurors c. 53 p. 135.
(1609) 7 Co. Rep. 17b, 77 Eng. Repr. 397.
4 1I Corinthians 6:15.
5 (1744-1745) 1 Atk. 21, 26 Eng. Repr. 15 or Willes 538, 125 Eng. Repr.
1310. The argument of counsel in this case was continued from term to term
during the years 1744 and 1745. The report in Atkyns gives the arguments
of counsel at considerable length.
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doubtful historically if Jews were barred as witnesses at the time
in which Lord Coke lived.6 All the judges agreed that a person
who believed in the Gentoo religion could take an oath. Un-
fortunately, none of them agreed upon the same test as the one
by which future cases were to be decided. This situation is made
worse by the fact that there are two reports of this case which
differ in several material particulars. According to the con-
temporary report published by Atkyns, the Lord Chief Baron of
the Exchequer (Parker) considered it enough if the witness
believed in a God whom he regarded as the Creator of the Uni-
verse. Even more liberal views were entertained by Lee, Lord
Chief Justice of the King's Bench, who intimated that perhaps in
certain cases even atheists might be sworn. Lord Chancellor
Hardwicke's opinion is vague. He apparently would require a
belief in God and His providence, but under this view God must
be thought of as a being who consciously gives rewards and
punishments. The opinion of Willes, the Lord Chief Justice of
the Common Bench, is the one whose language is most frequently
cited. In it he declares that all persons must believe in a God
and also that this God has power to give future rewards and pun-
ishments in the next world. In the other report of this case,
which was not published until 1800, but was based on manu-
scripts given by the grandson of Willes to the reporter, only
Willes' opinion is given.7 Besides certain merely verbal changes
ind changes in the paragraphing of the opinion, the meaning of
the proposed test has been radically altered. This report would
allow the rewards and punishments to be given either in this
world or the next. The conclusions of the Court may be sum-
marized as follows. All the judges, except the doubtful Lee, re-
quire a belief in God. Two of the four require that the God be
capable of punishing wickedness. None of the judges require a
A new Biblical text was also found. "Then Peter opened his mouth and
said, Of a truth I perceive that God is no respector of persons; but in every
nation he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with him."
Acts 10:34-35.
7The Supreme Court of Connecticut expressly ruled that the report of
Atkyns is correct. Atwood v. Welton (1828) 7 Conn. 66. Most American
courts in the early cases adopted the test laid down by Chief Justice Willes
as reported by Atkyns. See Frank Swancara, Non-Religious Witnesses, 8
Wis. Law Rev. (Dec. 1932), p. 3.
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belief in a future life, unless the Atkyns report of Willes' views is
correct.
Such was the state of the common law when the American col-
onies successfully revolted. Although many of these colonies had
been founded by persons attempting to escape religious persecu-
tion in England, nevertheless their colonial history is full of ex-
amples of religious bigotry. Under these conditions it is surpris-
ing that the earlier State constitutions contained express reli-
gious tests. In Georgia,8 New Jersey,9 North' 0 and South Caro-
lina,"l and Vermont' 2 all office holders were required to believe
in some form of the Protestant religion. In New Hampshire the
governor and all members of the legislature must be Protestants. 3
In Massachusetts 1 and Maryland' 5 all public officials had to de-
clare on oath their belief in the Christian religion. In Pennsyl-
vania16 and Delaware17 the officials must subscribe to a more
complicated formula which involved an acknowledgement of the
divine inspiration of both the Old and the New Testaments. Only
in Connecticut, New York, Rhode Island, and Virginia were there
no express religious tests. Some of these religious discrimina-
tions showed astonishing vitality. The Maryland provision
'Constitution of 1777, Art. VI. On historical matters relating to state
constitutions and religious tests, see Hale v. Everett (1868) 53 N. H. 9;
Clarence E. Martin, The American Judiciary and Religious Liberty, 62
American Law Review 658; Dr. Robert Baird, Religion in America; Holy
Trinity Church v. United States (1892) 143 U. S. 457.
9 Const. 1776, art. 19.
"'Const. of 1776, art. 22.
1' Const. of 1778, art. 38.
12 Const. of 1777 ch. 1, art. 3.
13 Const. of 1784; James Fairbanks Colby, Manual of the Constitution of
the State of New Hampshire.
14 Const. of 1780, ch. 6, art. 1.
15 Const. of 1776, art. 55.
16 The Pennsylvania test required "a belief in God, the Creator and
Governor of the universe, the rewarder of the good and the punisher of the
wicked" and an acknowledgment that the "Scriptures of the Old and New
Testaments were given by divine inspiration." Const. of 1776, sec. 10.
17 In Delaware public officers were required to make and subscribe the
following declaration: "I, A. B., do profess faith in God the Father, and in
Jesus Christ, His only Son, and in the Holy Ghost, one God, blessed for ever-
more; and I do acknowledge the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testa-
ment to be given by divine inspiration."
Const. of 1776, art. 22.
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lasted until 1851 while the more drastic New Hampshire require-
ment was not repealed until 1877.
The present constitutions of the various states prohibit re-
ligious tests, in the sectarian sense, but preserve one requirement
which is obviously religious. Pennsylvania 8 and Tennessee' 0
still expressly require of public officers a belief in God and a future
state of rewards and punishments. Arkansas, 20 Maryland,
21
Mississippi,2 2 North Carolina,23 South Carolina, 24 and Tex-
as25 require a belief in the Supreme Being. In all states
there is a constitutional provision to the effect that public
officials must take an oath or affirmation. In most states there
is also a provision that no person shall be denied any civil or
political right because of his rc'-igious opinions. 26
Assuming, without conceding or discussing the point, that no
violation of the Federal Constitution is involved, the courts would
find no difficulty in applying provisions which require a belief in
God.27 It is possible, however, that different conclusions might
18 Constitution of 1874, Art. I, sec. 4.
19 Constitution of 1870, Art. IX, sec. 2. This same constitution contains
a provision that "no political or religious test, other than the oath to support
the constitution of the United States and of this state, shall ever be required
as a qualification to any office or public trust under this state". Art. I, sec. 4.
Apparently Article IX must be considered as a mere statement of what the
drafters of the constitution considered Article I meant.
20 Constitution of 1874, Art. XIX, sec. 1.
21 Constitution of 1867, Art. 37 of the Declaration of Rights.
22 Constitution of 1890, Art. XIV, sec. 265.
23 Constitution of 1868, Art. VI, sec. 8.
24 Constitution of 1895, Art. XVI, sec. 4.
2.5 Constitution of 1876, Art. I, sec. 4.
26 Such provisions exist in Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey,
New Mexico,, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
27 The only difficulty which is apt to arise is in determining whether the
person believes in a "future state of rewards and punishments" as required
by the Pennsylvania and Tennessee constitutions. Discussing a similar pro-
vision, the South Carolina Supreme Court reached the conclusion that it
would bar Jews. State v. Pitt (1914) 166 N. C. 268, 271, 80 S. E. 1060.
This is obviously erroneous no matter what the court may have considered
the teachings of the Hebrew religion to be. The language in which this
test is framed is a mere adoption of the language used by Willes in Omichund
v. Barker (according to the Atkyns report). Nevertheless, Willes and all
the judges used the fact that Jews could take an oath as a reason for holding
Lord Coke's decision in Calvin's case wrong.
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be reached as to the effect of other provisions. Reactionary
courts might invoke the requirement of an oath or affirmation
28
as a basis of disqualifying one, either as a witness or as a public
officer, if he does not possess the religious belief which was requi-
site at common law to qualify him to take an oath.
According to one line of cases, which includes most of the
earlier cases dealing with the competency of witnesses, any person
in order to take a valid oath must possess the minimum of reli-
gious belief required by the common law.29 The legalistic reasoning
upon which this view is based has been well expressed by the
Supreme Court Commission of Ohio in the case of Clinton v.
State.30
Since oaths and affirmations cannot be dispensed with,...
the recognized . . . religious qualifications of the person to
take the necessary oath can no more be dispensed with than
the oath itself. . . Under our constitution the character of a
man's religious belief is not permitted to affect his com-
petency as a witness; yet to render him competent to take an
oath as a witness, his moral nature must be strengthened,
and his conscientuousness be quickened, by a belief in a su-
preme being, who will certainly, either in this life or in the
life to come, punish perjury.
One of the judges in a Tennessee case was even more outspoken,
declaring that the reason for the constitutional requirement of a
belief in God and a future state was that non-believers "cannot
be trusted. ' 3 1 If, for example, Presbyterians were excluded from
office on a judicial pretense that their doctrine of predestination
renders them unfit to be trusted, all would see in that practice a
flagrant violation of the principle of religious liberty and of con-
stitutional provisions which prohibit religious tests; but accord-
28 Constitutional and statutory provisions relating to affirmations do not
affect the question of the required religious beliefs. "The adoption of an
'affirmation' as a substitute for an oath was adopted not as a relaxation of
the rule requiring a belief in a Supreme Being, but in recognition of those
who believing (in the existence of God), conscientiously believe also that the
divine command is to, 'Swear not at all'." Wright v. State, 24 Ala. App. 378,
135 So. 636, 640 (dissenting opinion); Commonwealth v. Smith, 9 Mass. 107;
Clinton v. State (1877) 33 Ohio State 27.
29 Since the oath is basically the same for all purposes, obviously the same
religious beliefs will be required no matter for what purpose it is taken.
30 (1877) 33 Ohio State 27.
31 McClure v. State (1828) 9 Tenn. (1 Yerger) 206.
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ing to the reasoning of the Tennessee jurist, if non-believers in
God or Divine wrath are barred from office or the witness stand
because of their nonbelief, it is assumed that this matter "has
nothing to do with religious freedom."
These views, however, were quite consistent with other early
cases involving the competency of witness. Thus, in Alabama in
1841, a disbeliever in divine punishments was not allowed to take
the oath necessary to be a witness. No attention whatever was
paid to the constitutional provision that "the civil privileges or
capacities of any citizen shall in no way be diminished or enlarged
on account of his religious principles". 32 A like decision, under
similar constitutional provisions, was given in Vermont, the court
holding that it was "quite impossible" that an atheist "should be
sworn".33
The judges in the early days of our Republic believed in the then
oft repeated statement that the obligation of an oath is necessary
for the maintenance of peace and justice among men, and could
not imagine that a constitution could be intended to grant to an
unbeliever in divine judgments and punishments the right to par-
ticipate in any governmental matter or in the administration of
justice. Such persons were presumed to be untrustworthy and
"regarded with universal horror and indignation". 34 This atti-
tude of mind caused acquiescence in such statements of law as
that of Chief Justice Spencer of the New York Supreme Court of
Judicature in the case of Jackson v. Gridley :3
32 Blocker v. Burness (1841) 2 Ala. 354.
33 Arnold v. Estate of Arnold (1828) 13 Vt. 363.
34 The Quarterly Christian Spectator (New Haven, Conn.) for September
1829 in a caustic review of "The Demurrer", a book by Mr. Thomas Herttell
wherein the latter assailed the requirement of religious belief on the part
of witnesses.
35 18 Johns. 98 (1820). As to the nature of the belief required by most
courts, see Section 1818 Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed.). South Carolina fol-
lows the views of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke in Omichund v. Barker and
only requires a belief in God and His providence. State v. Abercrombie (1923)
130 S. C. 358, 126 S. E. 142. Iowa follows, apparently, the view Of Chief
Justice Lee and Chief Baron Parker in requiring only a belief in God. State
v. Jackson (1912), 156 Iowa 588, 137 N. W. 1034. In this connection it may
be observed that prosecutions for blasphemy were once deemed justified on
the ground that the offense tended to disqualify persons to be witnesses by
lessening their fears of future punishments. See Fundamentalism and the
Law, by Frank Swancara, in 55 United States Law Review (Nov. 1931), 593.
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By the law of England, which has been adopted in this
state, it is fully and clearly settled, that infidels who do not
believe in a God, or if they do, do not think that he will either
reward or punish them in the world to come, cannot be wit-
nesses in any case, nor under any circumstances.3 6
This language is a mere paraphrase of that used by Chief
Justice Willes in the case of Omichund v. Barker as reported by
Atkyns. According to that view or any other which is based on
a belief in Divine punishments, not only an atheist is proscribed,
but also any other person who does not believe in such retributions
for misdeeds. No belief in such judgments is expressed in the
pronouncements of some religious groups. Thus a spokesman
for the Unitarians says that there will be "eternal good for all
who have done well here" and "eternal hope for such as have done
ill here." 3 7 According to the reasoning of the cases thus far
cited, many of our eminent Unitarian jurists and statesmen
never qualified for their respective offices, because incompetent
to take a valid oath or affirmation.
Opposed to this narrowly legalistic construction, at least where
there are constitutional provisions purporting to secure equal
civil rights and capacities to all, regardless of their religious
beliefs, is another line of decisions, nearly all of which involve
the competency of non-religious witnesses. One of the most
recent of these is an Alabama case, holding that an atheist may
take an oath and testify, because such a right is granted him by
the constitutional provision "that the civil rights, privileges, or
capacities shall in no wise be diminished or enlarged on account
of his religion". 38 Cases to the same effect may be found in illi-
nois, 39 Kansas,4 0 Kentucky, 41 Missouri, 42 Virginia, 43 and West
Virginia.44 This principle is of course obviously applicable also
to one who has to take an oath of office. Accordingly, there is a
36 Italics author's.
37 Reverend J. T. Sunderland, What do Unitarians Believe (Unitarian-
Laymen's League, Boston).
3s Wright v. State (1931) 24 Ala. App. 378, 135 So. 636.
39 Hroneck v. People (1840) 134 Ill. 139, 24 N. E. 861.
40 Dickinson v. Beal (1900) 10 Kan. App. 233, 62 Pac. 724.
41 Bush v. Commonwealth (1882) 80 Ky. 244.
42 Londener v. Lichtenheim (1882) 11 Mo. App. 385.
43 Perry's Case (Va. 1846) 3 Gratt. 632.
"State v. Hood (1907) 63 W. Va. 182, 59 S. E. 971.
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Georgia decision that a party described by his adversary as "an
infidel of the order usually denominated Universalists" was en-
titled to hold the office of guardian, because the constitution pro-
vided that "no person shall be subject to any civil or political in-
capacity . . . in consequence of" his opinions. 45 Under this
view the oath becomes a means of impressing the person with the
solemnity of the occasion rather than an instrument for terrifying
the taker into performing his promise from fear of supernatural
punishment.46
It can safely be assumed that the operation of the Federal Con-
stitution is not, and cannot be, hindered by any guarantee of re-
ligious freedom contained in the constitution of any state. It is
therefore necessary to consider the effect of clause 3 of Article VI
of the Federal Constitution, which reads:
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and
the members of the several State Legislatures, and all execu-
tive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the
several states, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to sup-
port this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be re-
quired as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under
the United States.47
The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly held
that the words in the constitution are to be interpreted in the
light of their meaning at common law.48 This might be the basis
of a future holding that the requirement of an oath or affirmation
implies that he who is to take it must have the religious belief
which at common law was necessary to qualify one for taking an
oath. No court has yet been called upon to interpret this pro-
vision of the Constitution. In the absence of a precedent, any
court would be free to adopt a more liberal construction which
would better accord with present day liberalism and social
conditions. The framers of the Federal Constitution probably
4 5 Maxey v. Bell (1870) 41 Ga. 184.
4C Such a view is strengthened by statutes like R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 1718
that in administering the oath (here to witnesses) the officer shall adopt the
mode which appears most binding on the conscience of the person being sworn.
47 Italics author's.
48 Moore v. U. S. (1875) 91 U. S. 270, 274; Smith v. Alabama (1888) 124
U. S. 465, 478; U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark. (1898) 169 U. S. 649. See also 12
C. J. 197, note 51.
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believed that there was and always will remain a universal belief
in a personal, punishing and rewarding Deity, and it never oc-
curred to them to attempt to create and preserve equal rights for
those who believe merely in the Absolute, as do some philosophers,
or in the unknowable First Cause of Spencer, or those who have
no form of belief in a Supreme Being. Consequently the pro-
vision for oaths and affirmations contains nothing expressly
making all persons legally capable of taking them. The same
situation must have existed in the formulation of several of the
early State constitutions. In the constitution of Massachusetts
as it existed until 1833, there was the following clause :49
And every denomination of Christians, demeaning them-
selves quietly and as good subjects of the state, shall be
equally under the protection of the law.
Such a provision still exists in the constitution of New Hamp-
shire.50 It must have been presumed that non-Christians did not
exist, or that they had no rights which the believer was bound to
respect, being in a condition like that of the negro slaves. Thus,
it might well be urged that there was no intent to impose any re-
ligious test by the requirement of an oath. This view is strength-
ened by the fact that the next clause of the same sentence bans
the imposition of any "religious test" as a "qualification" for any
office under the United States. Finally, since the reason for the
common law rule has ceased with the lessening fears of super-
natural judgments felt by the average person, the maxim Cessante
ratione legis cessat lex ipsa should be applied.
Let us suppose that a non-believer goes through all the formal-
ities of an oath or affirmation in a jurisdiction which still imposes
this religious test. He has uttered all the usual words and signed
the usual form; but, if he then assumes the duties of the office to
which he has been validly elected or appointed, he is a mere
usurper. This situation may be illustrated by reference to the
well considered English case of Attorney General v. Bradlaugh.51
Charles Bradlaugh, who had been elected to serve as a member of
49 Art. III, Declaration of Rights (1780) before amendment by Art. XI
which was adopted Nov. 11, 1833.
50 James Fairbanks Colby, Manual of the Constitution of the State of New
Hampshire.
51 (1885) 14 L. R. 667.
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the British Parliament, was prosecuted for penalties for having
voted in the House of Commons without first having made and
subscribed the oath required of every member. He had in fact
said and done all that was possible in making and subscribing the
oath. Nevertheless, the court held that, simply because he had
no belief in Divine punishments, it was impossible for him to
make an oath, and therefore in a legal sense he had never taken
the oath required.
Even more serious than the possible civil disability or criminal
liability of the non-believing officer is the effect of the old rules,
if applied, upon the rights of third persons. After a jury had
found an accused guilty in "a case of clear and aggravated mur-
der", a clergyman furnished an affidavit to the effect that one of
the jurors was an "atheist". One of the judges of the Tennessee
Supreme Court would have quashed the conviction and ordered
a retrial of the case.52 Justice Peck said:
By our constitution such a person could not hold a civil of-
fice; he could not be a constable, nor even an administrator.
The constitution is the expressed will of the community; by
common consent, in article 8 section 2, no person who denies
the being of a God, or a future state of rewards and punish-
ments, shall hold any office in this government. Why? it
maybe asked. It is answered, because he cannot take an
oath-he cannot be trusted. This question has nothing to do
with religious freedom... He was an evil genius, in a sacred
place.
It can readily be imagined what harm to supposedly vested rights
and interests would be worked if the ordinary person realized
and could invoke the possibility of upsetting or preventing official
action by producing such evidence concerning the theological
opinions of the official.
In the early days of our Republic persons who were disquali-
fied to take an oath and hold office belonged to an inarticulate
class, and nothing was said or done in their behalf. As late as
1856, Dr. Robert Baird, the eminent Presbyterian historian,
wrote :53
52 McClure v. State (1828) 9 Tenn. (1 Yerger) 206.
53 Baird, Religion in America 575.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol18/iss2/2
THE SURVIVING RELIGIOUS TEST
The avowed Atheists are, happily, few in number, and are
chiefly to be found among the frequenters of our remaining
groggeries and rum-holes.
The godless have now largely deserted the rum-holes for the uni-
versities. In recent years Professor James H. Leuba found that
the majority of historians, physical scientists, biologists, sociolo-
gists, and psychologists do not believe in a personal Deity.54 Be-
sides such non-believers, there are many believers whose concep-
tion of God is otherwise than as a dispenser of rewards and pun-
ishments. There is accordingly a great mass of the best educated
of our fellow citizens who are disqualified from office according
to the view expressed by those American courts which purport to
follow the rule of Omichund v. Barker.
If members of some particular Christian sect were made in-
eligible to hold office by some express constitutional provision,
most Americans would recognize and denounce this impolitic dis-
crimination. In showing the injustice of alleged propaganda
against a Presidential nominee, a religious publication said :55
If no Catholic is allowed to be President (or governor, as
the case may be), shall any Catholic be permitted the priv-
ilege of paying taxes? Allowed? Say rather compelled! . . .
Shall Catholics fulfil duties, but have no rights? Shall they
bear responsibilities, but enjoy no corresponding privileges?
And is this good democracy? In the effort to suppress them,
are the bigots willing to abrogate democratic principles and
drive a coach and four through the constitution?
If we Catholics are to be debarred from political office,
shall we also be forbidden to enter the army or navy? Or
shall we be privileged to fight and die for America as always?
The principle invoked in the foregoing quotation is obviously as
applicable in behalf of non-believers in supernatural judgments
as it is in favor of members of any religious denomination.
Catholic writers who complain that in some communities Cath-
olic teachers are refused employment are complacent about the
exclusion of atheists from office in Maryland. Protestant writers
who see injustice in the alleged fact that Protestants have been
refused employment on a road staff in Catholic Ireland have had
5- Leuba, Belief in God and Immortality (1916).
55 Catholic World for October 1928, vol. 128 p. 103.
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no objection, thus far, to any law which bars from public office
one who does not believe in future punishments.50 Indeed, Chris-
tian writers have exhibited smug complacence and not shame
over discriminations against those who so fundamentally dif-
fered with their religious views. Thus, Dr. Robert Baird entitled
one of the chapters of his work, "The Government of the United
States shown to be Christian by its Acts". 57 In the text he cited
the legal religious requirements for taking an oath as an example
of the "spirit" which pervades our government.
If ever an effort is made to exclude the name of a candidate
from the ballot, or to disqualify him if elected, on account of his
inability to fear Divine wrath, the requirement of a religious
qualification for taking an oath would be invoked against him,
not by those who are interested in preserving a redemptive re-
ligion, but by thoge who design to aid their own political fortunes.
An atheist would be ejected from public office, not because of his
private opinions or their supposed effect upon his morality, but in
order to provide a sinecure for some political ally of the accuser.58
56 New Age for February 1930 p. 99.
5 7 Baird, op. cit. 246.
58 The importance of this element of selfishness is strikingly illustrated by
the conduct of heirs when they contest the validity of bequests for supposedly
anti-religious purposes. See Frank Swancara, A Court's Proscription of
Scientific Works, XX Georgetown Law Journal (March, 1932), p. 382. That
discriminations based on lack of religious belief generally result only in in-
justice, see Frank Swancara, Iniquity in the Name of Justice, XVIII Vir-
ginia Law Review (Feb. 1932), p. 415.
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